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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Alan Daniel Burtness appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict 
finding him guilty of aggravated battery, arguing that the district court abused its 
discretion by denying his midtrial motion for a mistrial. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Daniel McCullough was a guest at Burtness's house on January 19, 2010. (Tr., 
p.216, Ls.8-13.) During the course of the evening, Mr. McCullough entered Burtness's 
bedroom where he was sitting with his girlfriend, Jennifer Jewitt, and a fight ensued. 
(Tr., p.221, L.20- p.222, L.14; Tr., p.361, L.25- p.362, L.3; p.417, Ls.15-22; p.420, L.9 
- p.423, L.10.) Valerie Reichart, a friend of Mr. McCullough's, entered the room to find 
the two men struggling on the floor. (Tr., p.183, Ls.17-22.) The men were locked-up, 
fighting over a knife, which had both cut Burtness over his eye and cut a deep gash 
across Mr. McCullough's hand. (Tr., p.223, L.7 - p.224, L.4; p.422, Ls.10-18.) 
Burtness told Mrs. Jewitt to call the police, but Ms. Reichart intervened, telling Mrs. 
Jewitt that calling the police was unnecessary and removing Mr. McCullough from the 
fight. (Tr., p.185, Ls.5-21; p.212, Ls.4-20; p.369, Ls.15-20.) 
Mr. McCullough disengaged from the scuffle, stood up, and began to back away. 
(Tr., p.185, Ls.9-16; p.231, Ls.14-22; p.429, Ls.9-19.) After Mr. McCullough retreated, 
Burtness swung at him with· the knife, severing the muscles in Mr. McCullough's arm 
down to the bone and breaking both his ulna and radial bones. (Tr., p.186, L.21 -
p.187, L.24; p.232, Ls.6-25; p.395, L.24 - p.396, L.14.) As Mr. McCullough tried to 
escape, Burtness slashed at him again, slicing his back. (Tr., p.240, Ls.1-7.) 
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Mr. McCullough, leaving a trail of blood behind him, eventually made it outside 
and into the middle of the street where he fell to the ground, his blood pooling around 
him. (Tr., p.197, L.19 - p.198, L.1; p.310, L.11 - p.311, L.4.) Ms. Reichart took Mr. 
McCullough's five-year-old daughter away from the scene as a neighbor tended to Mr. 
McCullough and an ambulance was called. (Tr., p.209, L.8 - p.210, L.10.) Paramedics 
found Mr. McCullough at the scene and provided emergency medical attention as they 
transported him to the hospital. (Tr., p.305, L.22 - p.306, L.5.) 
Police, after interviewing witnesses and investigating the physical evidence at the 
crime scene, arrested Burtness. (R., pp.31-33.) The state charged Burtness with 
aggravated battery. (R., p.116-17.) The case went to trial. (See generally Tr.) After 
hearing the evidence and argument, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty. (R., 
p.232.) The district court entered judgment against Burtness and imposed a sentence 
of ten years with three years fixed, but suspended execution of that sentence and 
placed Burtness on four years of probation. (R., pp.255-59.) Burtness filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (Notice Of Appeal (filed on or about September 28, 2011 ).) 
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ISSUE 
Burtness states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the state violate Mr. Burtness' right to a fair trial by vouching for 
the State's witnesses? 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Burtness failed to establish error in the district court's denial of his motion for 
a mistrial that was predicated on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing 
argument? 
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ARGUMENT 
Burtness Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion For 
A Mistrial 
A. Introduction 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor said the following· 
Where do the facts come from? From the evidence presented. What we 
have in evidence in this trial, ladies and gentlemen, is the testimony of 
Valerie and Dan. 
Ladies and gentlemen, they both took this stand. They swore to tell 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The evidence shows 
you that they are credible. When you were watching Valerie and Dan 
testify, what was their demeanor like? Were they evasive and hostile, like 
some of the defense witnesses we saw? Were they consistent with each 
other? Were they aggravated [sic]? Did they look like they were 
searching for answers? No. The evidence, the demeanor, their 
presentation on the stand-
(Tr., p.495, Ls.7-20.) Defense counsel interrupted the state's closing, objecting to the 
characterization of the defense's witnesses. (Tr., p.495, Ls.21-24.) The district court 
sustained the objection and instructed the jury to "disregard the comments regarding the 
demeanor of the defense witnesses." (Tr., p.495, L.25 - p.496, L.2.) 
The prosecutor continued: 
Look to the State's witnesses. Look to Valerie. Look to Dan. Do 
you feel like they were lying to you? 
I respectfully submit they came across as genuine. For that reason 
you can believe them. 
(Tr., p.496, Ls.3-7.) Defense counsel again objected, asserting that the prosecutor was 
vouching for the state's witnesses, and moved for a mistrial. (Tr., p.496, Ls.8-11.) The 
prosecutor responded that he was specifically referring to the evidence and how it 
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showed credibility. (Tr., p.496, Ls.12-14.) The district court denied the motion for 
mistrial and admonished the prosecutor to "please state your argument and explain 
exactly what you meant." (Tr., p.496, Ls.15-17.) The prosecutor then explained in great 
detail how both the physical and testimonial evidence presented at trial supported the 
state's version of the case and asked the jury to return a guilty verdict. (Tr., p.496, L.18 
- p.500, L.16.) 
On appeal, Burtness argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for 
a mistrial, asserting that the state committed prosecutorial misconduct by vouching for 
its witnesses. (Appellant's brief, pp.10-16.) Burtness's arguments fail. The prosecutor 
did not vouch for the state's witnesses and thus did not interject error into the 
proceedings, much less commit misconduct. Even had the prosecutor's comments 
been error, Burtness was not prejudiced in the ultimate outcome of the case. Burtness 
has therefore failed to show error in the denial of his motion for mistrial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal, the standard for review on a motion for mistrial is well-established: 
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably 
exercised his discretion in light of the circumstances existing when the 
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the 
event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible 
error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion 
for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion" 
standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of 
reversible error. [The Court's] focus is upon the continuing impact on the 
trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's 
refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed 
retrospectively, constituted reversible error. 
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State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing State v. 
Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983)). Burtness bears the 
burden of showing that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his 
motion for a mistrial. State v. Ellis, 99 Idaho 606, 608, 586 P.2d 1050, 1052 (1978); 
State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30, 33, 674 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App. 1983). 
C. The District Court Did Not Err By Denying Burtness's Motion For A Mistrial 
Motions for mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29.1. State v. Barcella, 
135 Idaho 191, 197, 16 P.3d 288,294 (Ct. App. 2000). Under part (a) of that rule, "[a] 
mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the 
trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the 
courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair 
trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a). Thus, the error or legal defect triggering the mistrial motion must 
be sufficiently prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial before granting the 
motion is appropriate. When viewed in the context of the whole trial, Burtness has 
failed to establish error during the prosecutor's closing argument, nor does the record 
show any prejudice that deprived him of a fair trial. 
1. The Prosecutor Did Not Introduce Error Into The Proceedings During His 
Closing Argument 
When considering the denial of a motion for mistrial that arises out of argument, 
"[t]he threshold inquiry is whether the state introduced error." State v. Grantham, 146 
Idaho 490, 498, 198 P.3d 128, 136 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Shepherd, 124 Idaho at 57, 
855 P.2d at 894). Burtness argues that the prosecutor introduced error by "vouching" 
6 
for the state's witnesses during closing argument. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-15.) The 
prosecutor did no such thing, and Burtness has failed to show that the prosecutor 
introduced error into the trial during his closing argument. 
Prosecutors enjoy a considerable amount of latitude in closing argument and 
may fully discuss the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom. State v. 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003). A prosecutor may "express an 
opinion in argument as to the truth or falsity of testimony ... when such an opinion is 
based upon the evidence." State v. Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 288, 178 P.3d 644, 653 
(Ct. App. 2007); State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110 n.1, 594 P.2d 146, 148 n.1 (1979); 
see also State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 168, 983 P.2d 233, 241 (Ct. App. 1999); 
State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995). A prosecutor may 
also argue "that the state's evidence and theory of the case [is] more convincing." State 
v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20, 189 P.3d 477,482 (Ct. App. 2008). A prosecutor's opinions 
and argument do not constitute "vouching" unless the prosecutor interjects "personal 
belief' regarding the evidence or a witness's credibility, Timmons, 145 Idaho at 289, 178 
P.3d at 654, or asks jurors "to make their decision based upon ... the prosecutor's self-
proclaimed moral rectitude and integrity rather than addressing the evidence" Gross, 
146 Idaho at 20, 189 P.3d at 482. "Vowching" occurs when the prosecutor places "the 
prestige of the state behind the witness or refer[s] to information not given to the jury 
that supports the witness." State v. Wheeler, 149 Idaho 364, 369, 233 P.3d 1286, 1291 
(Ct. App. 2010) (citing United States v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
When taken in context, the prosecutor's statements at issue in this case do not 
even come close to impermissible "vouching." During closing argument, the prosecutor 
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did not reference any private information to which the jury was not also privy; he 
explicitly relied on what the jurors had seen and heard for themselves during trial 
regarding the witnesses' demeanor on the stand. (See Tr., p.495, Ls.7-20; p.496, Ls.3-
7.) Moreover, taking the prosecutor's statements in the context of his closing argument, 
the prosecutor merely commented on the credibility of the state's witnesses based on 
the evidence presented to the jury, both testimonial and physical. (See Tr., p.495, L.7 -
p.500, L.12.) The prosecutor did not "vouch" for the state's witnesses. Burtness has 
therefore failed to show that the prosecutor introduced error into the proceedings during 
his closing argument. 
2. Any Error Did Not Deprive Burtness Of A Fair Trial 
Even had the prosecutor introduced error into his closing argument, Burtness has 
still failed to show error in the district court's denial of his motion for a mistrial. Error 
alone is not sufficient in order to grant a mistrial; the error must prejudice the defendant 
so as to deprive him of the ability to receive a fair trial. I.C.R. 29.1. "The right to due 
process does not guarantee the defendant an error-free trial, but rather a fair one." 
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 498, 198 P.3d at 136 (citing Shepherd, 124 Idaho at 58, 855 
P.2d at 895). "The relevant question is whether the prosecutor's comments so infected 
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." 
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). Even 
were this Court to find that the prosecutor introduced error by reminding the jury of the 
demeanor exhibited by the state's witnesses while they were on the stand in front of the 
jury, a review of the record shows that such error did not deprive Burtness of the ability 
to receive a fair trial. 
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Burtness was charged with aggravated battery, which simply requires that he 
commit a battery "by means of a deadly weapon and/or instrument and/or caused great 
bodily harm and/or permanent disfigurement." (R., p.218 (Instruction No.14).) The 
physical and testimonial evidence conclusively established that Mr. McCullough had 
sustained "great bodily harm" from a knife-a slashed and scarred hand, arm, and back 
with a blood trail leading from outside of Burtness's bedroom to the middle of the street 
where it pooled beneath Mr. McCullough. (Tr., p.163, L.21- p.165, L.6; p.197, L.19 
p.198, L.1; p.227, L.15 - p.228, L.24; p.233, Ls.18-22; p.234, L.6 - p.235, L.8; p.241, 
L.21 - p.243, L.6; p.310, Ls.11-24.) The evidence also established that Burtness had 
committed the batteries. (Tr., p.186, L.21 - p.187, L.24; p.232, Ls.6-25; p.240, Ls.1-7; 
see also State's Ex. 5.) Burtness himself, downplaying the carnage, admitted that he 
"may have grazed" Mr. McCullough with the knife. (Tr., p.435, Ls.10-16.) On the day of 
the incident, Burtness also admitted in a sworn statement to police that he "slashed at 
[Mr. McCullough's] arm with the knife." (Tr., p.448, L.12 - p.449, L.7.) 
Burtness's defense at trial was predicated on a theory of self-defense. (See Tr., 
p.420, L.9 - p.439, L.14.) To show that he acted in self-defense, 
1. The defendant must have believed that the defendant was in 
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. 
2. In addition to that belief, the defendant must have believed that 
the action the defendant took was necessary to save the defendant from 
the danger presented. 
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable 
person, under similar circumstances, would have believed that the 
defendant was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury and 
believed that the action taken was necessary. 
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4. The defendant must have acted only in response to that danger 
and not for some other motivation. 
5. When there is no longer any reasonable appearance of danger, 
the right of self-defense ends. 
(R., p.224 (Instruction No.20).) The evidence presented at trial did not support a theory 
of self-defense. 
The witnesses who saw Mr. McCullough get cut with the knife, Mr. McCullough, 
Ms. Reichart, and Burtness, each agreed that there had been a fight between Mr. 
McCullough and Burtness on the bedroom floor. (Tr., p.183, Ls.17-22; p.229, Ls.2-11; 
p.424, Ls.5-16.) The witnesses also each agreed that the scuffle had ended when Ms. 
Reichart intervened and Mr. McCullough became submissive, disengaging from the 
scuffle, standing up, and backing away. (Tr., p.185, Ls.5-16; p.231, Ls.14-23; p.429, 
Ls.9-19.) At that point, after Mr. McCullough had retreated, Burtness retaliated, 
splaying Mr. McCullough's arm and slashing him across the back. (Tr., p.186, L.21 -
p.187, L.24; p.232, Ls.6-25; p.240, Ls.1-7.) Burtness himself testified that he seized the 
knife and took "another swing at him from-with my arm .... I had taken another slash at 
[Mr. McCullough]. And again, my adrenaline is running as fast as it can." (Tr., p.433, 
Ls.7-20.) Burtness further admitted that the swipe he took at Mr. McCullough with the 
knife "may have grazed him.... I did come after him one more time. That's all the 
energy I had." (Tr., p.435, Ls.10-16.) The evidence thus clearly showed that Burtness 
had not acted in self-defense when he slashed at Mr. McCullough with the knife and cut 
his arm and back. Burtness retaliated. Retaliation does not justify aggravated battery. 
The evidence establishing that Burtness committed an aggravated battery was 
overwhelming. Burtness's theory of self-defense was unsupported by the evidence 
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presented by Burtness himself. Even had the prosecutor's statements reminding the 
jury of the demeanor exhibited by the state's witnesses as they testified in front of the 
jury introduced error into the proceedings, Burtness still was not deprived of a fair trial. 
He has therefore failed to show prosecutorial misconduct or error in the denial of his 
motion for mistrial. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of the district 
court. 
DATED this 9th day of November, 2012. 
(~ ~
Deputy Attorney General 
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